Christian) and Aristotelian understandings of natural virtue. 4 In my view, this dichotomous characterization of ethical theory in the twelfth century fails to acknowledge the eclecticism of the actual thinkers and the diversity of their espoused views. A case in point is John of Salisbury. John provides perhaps a more difficult case than MacIntyre credits him with. On the one hand, MacIntyre is certainly correct in saying that John adopts distinctively Aristotelian constructions, not least in his moral psychology, according to which the formation of one's character derives from "external" sources: the repetition of specific sorts of actions until a fixed disposition toward virtue (or vice) is ingrained. 5 Yet John also demonstrates a Stoic/Christian mood, by proposing that the realm of political activity (which he knew intimately) was fraught with moral danger and that the earthly summum bonum resides outside the public domain in the life of withdrawn contemplation. 6 In sum, John displays strong elements of both the Stoic and the Aristotelian traditions, without any apparent awareness of a contradiction between them.
I have little doubt that many scholars will determine this to be simply another instance in which John may be found guilty of the philosophical incoherence of which he often stands accused. It is my contention, however, that such a conclusion constitutes an unwarranted rush to judgment. I shall argue instead that John's moral philosophy represents an attempt to cope with ostensibly contradictory visions of ethical life (such as those identified by MacIntyre) by charting a third way: specifically, a strategy of philosophically-informed eclecticism and non-dogmatism derived from his self-professed New Academic adherence to moderate skepticism, stemming from his reading of Cicero. This moral doctrine has a specific, albeit chastened, content built around the promotion of two paramount values: first, that individuals enjoy a right, and perhaps a duty, to intellectual liberty in judging for themselves about matters of right and wrong (an "internal" dimension); and second, that the yardstick of human action
